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In this Reply Brief, Appellants Deveaux and Marjorie Clark ("Clarks") will address 
five arguments raised by Deloitte & Touche, LLP ("Deloitte") in its Opposition 
Memorandum} 
UNTIL SUCH TIME AS THE CLARKS' TAX LIABILITY BECAME FIXED, 
THEY HAD ONLY AN "INCHOATE" OR CONTINGENT WRONG THAT WAS 
NOT AN ACTIONABLE. LEGAL OR REDRESSABLE INJURY 
Deloitte argues that in Utah "the general rule is that a negligence action accrues when 
the negligence occurs . . . " (Deloitte's Br., p. 6). That is an incorrect statement of the law. 
A cause of action accrues when the plaintiff could have first filed and prosecuted his or her 
lawsuit to a successful completion. Meyer v. McDonald, 635 P.2d 84, 86 (Utah 1981). 
Moreover, "accrual" as that term is used with regard to an event triggering the 
commencement of a statute of limitations is not merely the point in time a person first 
realizes that there has been a breach of duty owed to him or her by another. There must also 
be "actionable," "legal," or "redressable" injury. Whether one uses the term "actionable 
injury," "legal injury," or "redressable injury," the concept is one of "ripeness." 
1
 It is Appellants' belief that Deloitte's other arguments do not merit a response since 
they are obviously flawed. Deloitte, for example, contends that "as a practical matter, a 
plaintiff rarely, if ever, would need to prosecute its tax claim and its malpractice action 
simultaneously" because a taxpayer could enter into a tolling agreement with the accountant 
until the Tax Court decided the case. (Deloitte's Br., pp. 18-19). But that is pure 
speculation on the part of Deloitte unless Deloitte is conceding that it would readily have 
given such a tolling agreement to Appellants. If that is so. then Deloitte would certainly 
have never moved to dismiss the Clarks' claims based upon the statute of limitations, which 
it did. Additionally, Deloitte ignores the fact that when it repeatedly advised the Clarks to 
"contest" the IRS tax deficiency assessment and the Clarks relied upon that advice. Deloitte 
tolled the running of the statute of limitations. See infra at page 22. 
1 
An actionable injury, legal injury, or redressable injury is some cognizable and 
discernable detriment resulting from another's breach of duty for which the injured party can 
seek compensation through a court of law. See Winn v. Estate of Holmes, 815 P.2d 1231, 
1235 (Okl. App. 1991). Within the factual context of the instant case, the Clarks had no 
legally cognizable injury until the Tax Court decision was handed down. Prior to that time, 
the Clarks had an "inchoate" or contingent injury which, under Utah law, will neither 
support a claim for relief nor trigger the running of the state of limitations. See Seale v. 
Gowans, 923 P.2d 1361 (Utah 1996). 
In Seale, the Utah Supreme Court decided whether a deceased plaintiff's medical 
malpractice claim was barred by the two-year statute of limitations contained in § 70-14-4 
of the Utah Code. The defendant doctor in that case had misdiagnosed the deceased 
plaintiff's breast cancer. When the cancer was finally discovered approximately one year 
later, the patient underwent a radical mastectomy. Three years later, the cancer reappeared 
in the patient's left hip and she immediately sued for malpractice. The defendant doctor 
argued that the cause of action had actually accrued in 1987 when the misdiagnosis occurred 
because the plaintiff had sustained injury in the form of "enhanced risk" of the cancer's 
reoccurrence. Emphasizing that the law does not recognize an "inchoate wrong" and that 
a claim for negligence is not actionable until there is "actual loss or damage," the Utah 
Supreme Court rejected the notion that the patient's claim had accrued in 1987. 
The Seale Court went on say that: 
2 
Our holding that damages in the form of an enhanced risk 
only are not sufficient to start the running of the statute of 
limitations not only comports with generally accepted 
principles of tort law, but also minimizes the filing of 
speculative suits thus saving judicial time and resources. 
More importantly, any alternative ruling might effectively 
preclude a patient from any recovery, even when the significant 
harmful effect, such as the reoccurrence of cancer, later occurs 
.. .[I]f we were to adopt defendant's position, plaintiffs who 
are not exhibiting any actual physical harm but are facing 
the running of the limitations period would be forced to 
bring an action for injuries that may or may not occur in 
the future. However, many of these plaintiffs will be unable to 
produce the necessary evidence to show that the future harm is 
more likely to occur than not. Yet if the harm, such as the 
reoccurrence of cancer, actually later occurs, the plaintiff would 
be precluded from any recovery for devastating injuries by 
reason of having acquired an earlier claim for purely speculative 
ones. We believe that the better approach is to wait until 
the potential harm manifests itself, allowing for a more 
certain proof and fewer speculative lawsuits. 
{Id. at 1365-66) (emphasis added). The same rationale applies to the Clarks' situation. 
Unless and until their tax penalties and assessment became fixed by the Tax Court's 
decision, their injuries were contingent, inchoate, and speculative and so much so that the 
Clarks could not have maintained a cause of action against Deloitte. The Clarks' injuries 
were, in other words, not "ripe" for decision. See Colonia Insurance Co. v. Williams, 941 
F.Supp. 606, 608 (N.D. Miss. 1996) (holding that so long as a party's claim is subject to or 
may be disposed of by another pending proceeding, it is not "ripe" for litigation); Boerger 
v. Levin, 812 F.Supp. 564, 565 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (holding that in a legal malpractice action, 
the client's claims against the attorney are not 4%ripe" until the underlying lawsuit is 
adjudicated). 
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Deloitte attempts to get around the reasoning of Seale and the question of "ripeness" 
by arguing that the Clarks did in fact sustain actionable, legal, or redressable injury when 
they received the IRS 90-Day Letter. Deloitte argues that at this point in time the Clarks 
began to incur legal fees in order to challenge the tax assessment and penalty, and that such 
fees constitute an actionable injury. (Deloitte Br., p. 10). But that argument is specious. 
It is specious because it assumes that upon receipt of the 90-Day Letter, the Clarks could 
have sued for and recovered from Deloitte the cost of pursuing their tax appeal, which they 
could not have done. Just because a taxpayer is audited does not mean that the tax advice 
was below the standard of care. Just because the taxpayer receives a 90-Day Letter does not 
mean that the tax advice was substandard. More importantly, unless the tax advice was 
below the standard of care, the taxpayer has no right to sue his or her accountant for 
recovery of these expenditures. See Bronstein v. Kalcheim & Kalcheim, Ltd., 414 N.E.2d 
96(Ill.App. 1980). 
Bronstein is a case on point. The only difference between Bronstein and the instant 
case being that the defendants in that action were tax attorneys instead of accountants. The 
plaintiff in Bronstein sued his attorneys for bad tax advice on a divorce settlement. The 
attorneys, who represented themselves as "experts in the field of federal income tax law" 
advised Mr. Bronstein that if he labeled the reimbursement of his wife's attorney's fees as 
"additional alimony," these payments would be deductible on his federal income tax return. 
But the IRS took a different view and disallowed the deduction as a result of an audit. 
4 
Following that audit, Mr. Bronstein received a 90-Day Letter informing him of the 
additional tax assessment. 
Bronstein sued his attorneys for malpractice citing as his injuries the burden of either 
paying the additional tax or filing a petition in the United States Tax Court to contest the 
IRS's assessment of additional taxes owing. The attorneys moved to dismiss and the trial 
court granted that motion. The Illinois Court of Appeals affirmed, reasoning that 
Bronstein's action was "premature'' because: 
The issuance of the notice of deficiency (Le. 90-Day Letter) 
does not establish the plaintiff has suffered a loss. 
Furthermore, because plaintiff's tax liability has not yet 
been determined in the Tax Court, it is clear that plaintiff 
has not yet suffered any actual loss. 
(Id. at 98) (emphasis added). Like Bronstein's malpractice suit against his tax attorneys, the 
Clarks suit against their tax accountants was "premature" until such time as the Tax Court 
ruled that the tax advice was "bad" or "unlawful" thereby entitling them to sue for damages 
(attorney's fees, penalties, etc.) caused by that advice. 
Now Deloitte may wish it to be so, but Bronstein is not an aberration. In fact, when 
faced with the same issue (i.e., the accrual of malpractice cause of action when a proceeding 
in another forum may be dispositive of the underlying malpractice claim), Courts typically 
hold that the malpractice action is "premature," "contingent," or "speculative." See 
Boerger, 812 F.Supp. at 565; Bowman v. Abramson, 545 F.Supp. 227 (E.D. Pa. 1982). See 
alsoKJ.B. Inc. v. Drakulich,SU P.2d 1305,1307 (Nev. 1991) (holding that when there has 
been "no final adjudication" of the matter in which the malpractice allegedly occurred, the 
5 
element of injury or damage remains "speculative and remote, thereby making premature 
the cause of action for professional negligence"); Amfac Distribution Corp. v. Miller, 673 
P.2d 792, 794 (Ariz. 1983) (stating that for legal malpractice cases, the injury or damaging 
effect on a client "is not ascertainable until the appellate process is completed or waived 
by failure to appeal");2 Golden v. Duggins, 374 So.2d 243, 245 (Miss. 1979) ("no injury" 
until other action concluded); Marchand v. Miazza, 151 So.2d 372, 375 (La. App. 1963) 
("premature" until underlying lawsuit decided since damages are speculative until then); 
Wright v. Diabold, 217 N.Y.S.2d 238 (1961) ("premature" because damages are 
"contingent" upon outcome of other suit). 
The fore°;oin£ case law all involve situations in which the client and victim of le^al 
malpractice was attempting to sue his or her attorney when there was another action pending 
that would ultimately be dispositive of the alleged malpractice. In each of these cases, the 
Appellate Courts concluded that until the underlying lawsuit was decided, the client's claims 
were not actionable because they were "speculative," "contingent," or "premature." But 
the concept is really one of "ripeness" or justiciability. More importantly, it applies to 
situations other than malpractice claims. It applies to every instance in which there is 
another proceeding pending which may dispose of a party's claims. See Colonia Insurance, 
2
 Amfac was apparently cited with approval by the Utah Court of Appeals in Merkley v. 
BeaslinJlSP.2d 16,19 (Utah App. 1989). Merkley holds that on a legal malpractice claim, 
the cause of action accmes and the statute of limitations commences to run when the act 
complained of is discovered or, in the exercise of reasonable care, should have been 
discovered. (Id. at 17). 
6 
941 F.Supp. at 608; Aircraft and Diesel Equipment Corp. v. Hirsch, 62 F.Supp. 520, 524 
(D. D.C. 1945); Romano v. American Casualty Company, 834 F.2d 968 (11th Cir. 1987). 
Other Courts have applied this same "ripeness" reasoning to hold that the client's 
cause of action for legal malpractice does not accrue and, therefore, the statute of limitations 
does not commence to run until the underlying suit is decided. See Shaw v. State 
Department of Administration, 816 P.2d 1358 (Alaska 1991); Pizel v. Zuspann, 795 P.2d 
42, modjied 803 P.2d 205 (1990); Stephens v. CMC, 905 P.2d 797 (Okl. 1995). See also 
Boerger, 812 F.Supp. at 566 fn. 4 (noting that until the claim becomes "ripe" after the 
underlying lawsuit has been decided, the statute of limitations does not begin to run). The 
rationale for concluding that the statute of limitations does not commence to run in legal 
malpractice actions until the underlying litigation is finally determined was cogently stated 
by the Oregon Supreme Court in United States National Bank v. Davies, 548 P.2d 966 
(1976). 
In Davies, a malpractice suit was filed against the defendant attorneys to recover 
money the client paid in settlement of lawsuit with a corporation in which he was an officer. 
The corporation was in the funeral marker or monument business and had on hand customer 
trust funds for prepaid funeral related services. The corporation sued the former officer for 
having sold his stock to the corporation and accepting those corporate trust funds in payment 
for his shares of stock in the corporation, which was illegal. The officer had done this solely 
upon the advice of his attorneys, and the malpractice action was commenced to recover the 
settlement money and attorney's fees incurred by the client in defending the suit brought by 
7 
the corporation. The attorneys moved to dismiss arguing that the statute of limitations had 
expired and the trial court granted that motion. On appeal, the Oregon Supreme Court 
reversed. In doing so, the Davies Court specifically rejected the notion that incurring 
attorney's fees to defend the lawsuit would give rise to "actionable" or "legal" harm when 
the underlying malpractice had not been established: 
There is no doubt that. . . [plaintiffs] necessity to defend the 
action caused him damage more than two years prior to 
commencement of the present action. It is not so clear, 
however, that at that time it could yet be determined that 
his expense of defense was caused by negligent advice by 
defendants. In many situations, the closeness of the legal 
questions involved would make it impossible to ascertain until 
the ultimate determination of the case whether it was brought as 
a result of the attorney's bad advice or whether it was a result of 
a misapprehension on the part of the party who sued as to his 
legal rights. In the present instance, if . . . [plaintiff] had 
won the case brought against him, he would not normally be 
in a position to claim that negligent advice on the part of the 
present defendants was a cause of his expense of defense. 
{Id. at 969) (emphasis added). Like Bronstein, Davies also makes clear that even though the 
client may have incurred legal expenses as a result of the advice he or she received from an 
accountant or attorney, there is no right to sue to recover those expenses unless and until it 
is determined that the advice was "bad" or unlawful.3 Again, this is a question of "ripeness" 
3
 Davies also disposes of Deloitte's argument that even assuming the taxpayer's injuries 
do not become actionable until the Tax Court decision, the taxpayer suffers no harm by 
making the statute of limitations commence to run upon receipt of the 90-Day Letter since 
"a Tax Court decision would typically be issued well prior to the expiration of the 
malpractice limitation " (Deloitte £r. p. 19). Deloitte goes on to argue, for example, that 
even if the statute of limitations commenced to run upon the Clarks' receipt of the 90-Day 
Letter, they still had 15 months in which to commence their lawsuit following the Tax Court 
decision. (Deloitte'si?r., p. 18). This same situation, however, also occurred in Davies. In 
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and that is why Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. v. Lane, 565 So.2d 1323 (Fla. 1990) is the 
better reasoned case law on accountant malpractice.4 
Like the Clarks, Peat, Marwick, Mitchell involved husband and wife taxpayers suing 
their accountants for bad tax advice, including the preparation of their federal income tax 
return. The accountants in Peat, Marwick, Mitchell had advised the taxpayers to invest in 
limited partnerships and to claim deductions for losses incurred by those limited 
partnerships. Like the Clarks, the Lanes received a 90-Day Letter from the IRS. The Lanes, 
Davies, the advice to sell the stock was given in 1967, the corporation sued the officer in 
August of 1971, the settlement occurred in May of 1973, and the malpractice action was 
commenced in 191 A. Oregon had a two year statute of limitations on legal malpractice, 
which means that from the time the suit was commenced and attorney's fees were incurred 
by the officer in defending that suit until the eventual settlement with the corporation, the 
two year statute of limitations had not expired. But this was irrelevant to the Davies Court's 
decision since the focus is upon when the cause of action accrued. That is the key 
determination, because a party is entitled to the full limitation period to investigate, prepare 
and bring their action, especially the Clarks who upon the sale of their business retired to 
California, which was the state of their residence when the tax return was filed. (Rec. p. 
202). 
4
 Deloitte argues that the fact that Peat, Marwick, Mitchell is the only case to hold that 
a taxpayer's cause of action against his or her accountant does not accrue until the Tax Court 
decision is rendered somehow makes that decision defective or otherwise suspect. (See 
Deloitte's Br., p. 3 fn. 4). Yet that argument ignores the fact that one can find case law to 
justify every conceivable date for accrual of a taxpayer's cause of action against his or her 
accountant. There are cases which say the cause of action accrues when the bad tax advice 
is given or the tax return is filed. Other cases hold that the cause of action accrues when the 
taxpayer receives the audit letter. Cases also exist that say the cause of action accrues when 
the taxpayer receives the 30-Day Letter and/or 90-Day Letter. (See Appellants' Op. Br., pp. 
15-16). But the thing that distinguishes Peat, Marwick, Mitchell from these other decisions, 
however, is that Peat, Marwick, Mitchell approached the question from an "actionable 
injury" or "ripeness" perspective, which is the same approach taken by the Utah Supreme 
Court in Seale. This argument likewise ignores the fact that Peat, Marwick, Mitchell is 
consistent with the "ripeness" case law from numerous jurisdictions. 
9 
also like the Clarks, were advised by their accountants to fight the assessment and they, too, 
followed that advice. The IRS eventually prevailed and the Lanes brought a malpractice 
action against their accountants, which was dismissed by the trial court based upon the 
expiration of the statute of limitations. But on appeal, the Rorida Court of Appeals reversed 
the trial court because: 
[A] cause of action for professional malpractice does not arise 
until the existence of redressable harm has been 
established.' . . . The Lanes did not suffer redressable harm 
until the Tax Court entered judgment against them. Until 
that time, the Lanes knew only that Peat, Marwick might have 
been negligent; however, if the Tax Court did not uphold the 
deficiency, the Lanes would not have a cause of action 
against Peat, Marwick for accounting malpractice. 
(Lane v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 540 So.2d 922,924 (Fla.3d D.C.A. 1989) (emphasis 
added). The Florida Supreme Court granted certiorari and affirmed the Court of Appeals' 
ruling. 
The issue before the Florida Supreme Court in Peak, Marwick, Mitchell was when 
the "redressable" harm or injury occurred. Was it when the Lanes received the ninety day 
letter or when the Tax Court Judgment was entered? (565 So.2d 1325). More importantly, 
in answering this question, the Florida Supreme Court looked to and was persuaded by the 
analogous situation of attorney malpractice: 
This situation is not unlike attorney malpractice actions. A clear 
majority of the District Courts have expressly held that a cause 
of action for legal malpractice does not accrue until the 
underlying legal proceeding has been completed on 
appellate review because, until that time, one cannot 
determine if there was any actionable error by the attorney. 
10 
Peat, Marwick asserts that any malpractice resulting from the 
advice which a professional gives concerning tax matters is 
different from attorney malpractice because any cognizable 
legal injury with respect to accounting malpractice depends not 
upon a determination by a court of law but, instead, upon a 
determination by the IRS. Peat, Marwick argues that the Lanes' 
cause of action accrued when they received their 'Ninety-Day 
Letter from the IRS, reasoning that at that point, the Lanes 
have sustained a legally cognizable injury. While Peat, 
Marwick maintains that the letter reflected the IRS's conclusive 
determination that the Lanes had underpaid their federal income 
tax, it acknowledges that the Lanes had the option to pay the 
tax owed or to prove that they did not owe the tax by 
petitioning for a redetermination of the deficiency in Tax 
Court. 
{Id. at 1325-26) (emphasis added). 
According to the Florida Supreme Court, it was the taxpayer's opportunity to prove 
that the tax was not owing that made their malpractice claim not "redressable" or "ripe" for 
decision until the Tax Court had ruled: 
In this case, the Lanes chose to appeal the IRS's determination 
to the United States Tax Court, in accordance with the advice 
given them by Peat, Marwick. We find, consistent with the 
holdings in numerous attorney malpractice cases, that until 
their Tax Court action was final, the Lanes did not have an 
action for malpractice. We reject Peat, Marwick's contention 
that an IRS deficiency determination conclusively establishes an 
injury upon which to base a professional malpractice action. If 
we were to accept that argument, the Lanes would have had 
to file their accounting malpractice action during the same 
time they were challenging the IRS's deficiency notice in 
their Tax Court appeal, such a course would have placed 
him in the wholly untenable position of having to take 
directly contrary positions in these two actions. In the Tax 
Court, the Lanes would be asserting that the deduction 
Peat, Marwick advised them to take was proper, while they 
would simultaneously argue in a Circuit Court malpractice 
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action that the deduction was unlawful and that Peat, 
Marwick's advice was malpractice. 
To require a party to assert these two wholly inconsistent 
positions in order to maintain a cause of action over 
professional malpractice is illogical and unjustified. Until 
the Tax Court determination, both the Lanes and Peat 
Marwick believe that the accounting advice was correct; 
consequently, there was no injury.5 To hold otherwise would 
mean that an accountant's client would have an action for 
malpractice as soon as the client received a 'Ninety-Day Lettef 
from the IRS. That result is contrary to common sense and 
reason. 
{Id. at 1325-26) (emphasis added). 
THE UNEQUAL TREATMENT BETWEEN TAX ACCOUNTANTS AND TAX 
ATTORNEYS INHERENT IN THE DISTRICT COURT'S RULING IS 
PROPERLY BEFORE THIS COURT 
If the Clarks had received the bad tax advice from a tax attorney rather than a tax 
accountant, the case law clearly establishes that their cause of action against the negligent 
attorney would not have accrued until the Tax Court decision became final. The Clarks 
argued before the District Court that case law developed in this analogous area of attorney 
malpractice should govern in this situation and they even referred the District Court to that 
case law. {Rec. pp. 247 and 308). The District Court, however, rejected that argument, and 
in doing so arbitrarily and capriciously treated victims of accountant malpractice differently 
5
 The Peak, Marwick, Mitchell holding is also consistent with the "discovery rule" 
articulated for legal malpractice by the Utah Court of Appeals in Merkley, 778 P.2d at 17, 
which is a factual inquiry case specific. Both the Lanes and the Clarks had no way of 
knowing that the tax advice was "unlawful" until they received a determination to that effect 
from the Tax Court. Prior to that point in time, any position they took with respect to the 
validity of the advice they had received from their respective accountants would have been 
speculation. 
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than victims of attorney malpractice. Consequently, the Clarks argued in their Opening Brief 
that in doing so, the District Court's decision was in fact a violation of the Clarks' due 
process and equal protection rights. (Appellants' Op. Br., pp. 22-23). Deloitte did not 
respond to this argument other than to claim that it should not be considered since it was 
never presented to the District Court. (Deloitte's Br., p. 21 fn. 14). Deloitte likewise 
suggests that this Court should not consider this equal protection argument since it was not 
"adequately briefed" in the Clarks' Opening Brief But Deloitte is incorrect as to both 
matters. 
While it is true that the Clarks did not use the terms "due process" or "equal 
protection" in the Briefs which they filed with the District Court, they did argue the 
application of the analogous body of law developed under attorney malpractice, which is all 
that is required to preserve for appeal the issue of their "dueprocess" and "equalprotection" 
violations occurring as a result of the District Court's rejection of that case law. This is so 
because arguments which are not dependent upon new facts and are closely related to and 
could have been inferred from a party's contentions before the District Court may be 
presented for appellate review. Alaska Marine Pilots v. Hendsch, 950 P.2d 98,109 (Alaska 
1997). 
With respect to Deloitte's contention that the due process and equal protection 
argument was not "adequately brief that, too, is incorrect. The "adequacy" of the briefing 
depends upon the complexity or the legal issues involved and the disparate treatment 
between tax accountants and tax attorneys inherent in the District Court's ruling is not a 
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matter that requires extensive briefing. Tax accountant and tax attorneys are equally 
qualified to provide tax advice and complete tax returns. Consequently, it is unconstitutional 
to treat them differently for purposes of limiting their potential liability to their respective 
clients. See, e.g., Berry By and Through Berry v. Beech Aircraft, 111 P.2d 670, 678 (Utah 
1985) (setting forth cases in which numerous jurisdictions had struck down statutes of 
repose on state and federal equal protection ground because these statutes prohibited suits 
against some tortfeasors but not others). 
PUBLIC POLICY WEIGHS HEAVILY IN FAVOR OF THE CLARKS' 
POSITION THAT THEIR CLAIM AGAINST DELOITTE DID NOT ACCRUE 
UNTIL THEIR TAX LIABILITY BECAME FIXED 
In their Opening Brief, the Clarks pointed out that if a taxpayer challenging the IRS 
additional tax assessment were required to bring a malpractice action against his or her 
accountant prior to conclusion of the Tax Court proceeding, it would give rise to a host of 
a problems. There would be, for example, the possibility of inconsistent verdicts, a waste 
of judicial resources, a difficulty of proof, and the serious evidentiary problems of 
contending in a malpractice action that tax advice was below the standard of care while at 
the same time asserting before the Tax Court that that same advice was in accordance with 
existing tax laws. {Op. Br., pp. 18-22). The Clarks argued, therefore, that when the 
taxpayer elects to proceed to litigate the issue of his or her tax liability in the Tax Court, the 
better policy is to find that the cause of action does not accrue until after the Tax Court had 
fixed the injury. But Deloitte argues that the public policy arguments put forth by the Clarks 
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are either incorrect legal assumptions. (Deloitte, Br., pp. 17-21). Once more, Deloitte is 
simply wrong on these matters. 
With respect to Deloitte's contention that there is no harm or problem with a taxpayer 
pursuing at the same time both an action in Tax Court and a claim for accountant 
malpractice, that is a problem which numerous Courts have recognized, including the Utah 
Supreme Court. The Florida Supreme Court in Peak, Manvick, Mitchell, for instance, stated 
that requiring a taxpayer to simultaneously assert these two legally inconsistent positions in 
order to maintain a cause of action for professional malpractice was both "illogical and 
unjustified." {Peat, Marwick, Mitchell, 565 So.2d at 1326) (emphasis added). The Oregon 
Supreme Court in Davies was even more critical of Deloitte's proposal of simultaneous 
lawsuits: 
[I]t does not seem wise to encourage the filing of such 
provisional actions. More important, it could prove to be a 
disaster to a plaintiffs defense of the action brought against 
him and, thus, perhaps disastrous to his former legal 
advisors as well. In the present case, plaintiffs . . . would 
have been defending one suit or action, claiming he had 
acted in conformance with the law, while simultaneously 
maintaining an action against defendants, claiming that he 
had not acted in conformance with the law because of faulty 
advice from defendants. Such an inconsistent position 
would have given rise to impeachment of . . . [plaintiff] in 
his defense of the action brought against him, but certainly 
is not desirable from either of the present party's point of 
view. 
{Davies, 548 P.2d at 970) (emphasis added). The danger of suing on speculative or 
premature claims was also one of the factors that apparently influenced the Utah Supreme 
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Court in Seale, See 923 P.2d at 1365-66 (discussing the ill effects of requiring injured 
parties to sue on premature actions). 
Seale holds that damages in the form of a patient's enhanced risk of cancer are not 
sufficient to start the running of the statute of limitations. The Seale Court characterized this 
ruling as not only being consistent "with generally accepted principles of tort law, but 
also minimizes the filing of speculative suits, thus saving judicial time and resources." 
{Id. at 1364) (emphasis added). The Seale Court went on to consider and reject the 
argument by defendants that a medical malpractice plaintiff whose only injury is the risk of 
reoccurrence of cancer should sue immediately with the following reasoning relevant to the 
Clarks' situation: 
[I]f we were to adopt defendants' position, plaintiffs who 
are not exhibiting any actual physical harm but are facing 
the running of the limitations period would be forced to 
bring an action for injuries that may or may not occur in 
the future. However, many of these plaintiffs will be able to 
produce the necessary evidence to show that the future 
harm is more likely to occur than not. Yet if the harm, such 
as the reoccurrence of cancer, actually later occurs, the 
plaintiff would be precluded from recovery for devastating 
injuries by reason of having acquired an earlier claim for 
purely speculative ones. We believe that the better 
approach is wait until the potential harm manifests itself, 
allowing for more certain proof and fewer speculative 
lawsuits. 
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(Id. at 1365-66) (emphasis added).6 Thus, contrary to Deloitte's suggestion, the policy in 
Utah is against speculative suits and needless expenditure of judicial resources. 
A HOLDING THAT THE CLARKS' CAUSE OF ACTION DID NOT ACCRUE 
UNTIL THE TAX COURT DECISION WOULD NOT VIOLATE THE POLICY 
AGAINST STALE CLAIMS UNDERLYING THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS 
Deloitte argues that the fundamental purpose of the statute of limitations is to prevent 
litigation of stale claims and that this policy would be grossly violated if, as the Clarks 
contend, their cause of action did not accrue until the Tax Court decision became final. To 
bolster this argument, Deloitte insists that there was no reason for the Clarks to stop at the 
Tax Court level but that they could have and perhaps should have appealed that decision. 
(Deloitte Br., p. 2 fn. 1). This argument reflects a very basic misunderstanding of both Tax 
Court proceedings and the effects of a judgment handed down by the United States Tax 
Court. 
6
 Deloitte suggests that the proper approach would have been for the Clarks to have filed 
a malpractice action while pursing the Tax Court review and then move to stay the 
malpractice action until the Tax Court decided the issue of their tax liability. (Deloitte's Br., 
p. 18). While this suggestion may seem plausible, it is not legally sound. It is not legally 
sound because one of the crucial elements required for a lawsuit is that "the issues between 
the parties must be ripe for decision." Jenkins v. Swan, 675 P.2d 1145, 1148 (Utah 1983). 
If the issues are not ripe, the District Court must dismiss the lawsuit. See Salt Lake County 
v. Bangerter, 928 P.2d 384, 386 (Utah 1996). Unless and until the Tax Court decision was 
handed down, the Clarks' claims were not ripe. See Colonia Insurance Co., 941 F.Supp. 
at 608; Boerger, 812 F.Supp. at 565. Such a "premature" lawsuit would be, in other words, 
subject to dismissal for lack of jurisdiction, which means the District Court would have no 
authority to enter a stay. SeeBronstein,4\4N.E2dat9S;K.J.B.,Sll P.2dat \301;Amfac, 
673 P.2d at 792; Golden, 374 So.2d at 245; Marchand, 151 So.2d at 375; Wright, 217 
N.Y.S.2dat238. 
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The 30-Day Letter and 90-Day Letter which the Clarks received from the IRS were 
only that agency's assessment of the Clarks' additional tax liability. This assessment would 
not become collectible unless the Clarks waived their right of review, which they did not. 
Instead, the Clarks proceeded to try the tax deficiency claim by the IRS before the United 
States Tax Court. It is important to emphasize the Tax Court is a "trial court." See Flight 
Attendants Against UAL Offset v. C.I.R., 165 F.3d 572, 577 (7th Cir. 1999). Because it is 
a trial court, the Tax Court decides cases on the testimony of witnesses, both fact and expert, 
exhibits, etc. Moreover, following such trials, the Tax Court makes findings of fact, 
conclusions of law, and enters judgments. See Missouri River Sand Co. v. C.LR., 114 F.2d 
334, 337 (8th Cir. 1985). The Tax Court decision becomes a "final judgment" within 90 
days after entry unless an appeal is taken. 26 U.S.C. § 7483. An appeal from a Tax Court 
decision, however, is a very serious matter for a taxpayer and not one to be taken lightly. 
To begin with, like any appeal the potential taxpayer appellant must be concerned 
about his or her chances of success. Penalties and interest accrue during the appeal process 
and are a part of the judgment if the appeal is unsuccessful. Thus, the taxpayer gains 
nothing by appealing an adverse Tax Court decision and losing that appeal. In fact, he or 
she is saddled with additional interest on the judgment. Appeals also cost money and, unlike 
deep pocket players such as Deloitte, the cost of an appeal is an important factor to the 
ordinary taxpayer, especially retired taxpayers like the Clarks. Furthermore, the appeal is 
to the United States Court of Appeals and the scope of review before the Court of Appeals 
is "in the same manner and to the same extent as decisions of the District Court in civil 
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actions tried without a jury . . ." 26 U.S.C. § 7482(a)(1). Stated otherwise, while the 
Court of Appeals reviews the Tax Court's decision on questions of law de novo, the Tax 
Court's findings of fact can only be disturbed if they are clearly erroneous. See Smith v. 
C.I.R., 926 F.2d 1470 (6th Cir. 1991). This standard and the attendant cost of an appeal 
would certainly give a taxpayer pause to consider whether the appeal of an adverse Tax 
Court decision would be in his or her best interest. But the taxpayer has added impedance 
to carefully consider undertaking the appeal of an adverse Tax Court decision because the 
Court of Appeals is empowered "to impose damages in any case where the decision of 
the Tax Court is affirmed and it appears that the notice of appeal was filed merely for 
delay." (26 U.S.C. § 7482(c)(4)) (emphasis added). It is thus not true, as Deloitte contends 
that taxpayers, including the Clarks, could opt to drag out the tax review process with appeal 
after appeal. It is similarly not true as, Deloitte contends, that the Tax Court decision is of 
no consequence.7 
7
 Another disingenuous argument put forth by Deloitte is the "windfall" argument which 
it raises by implication. The Clarks had a duty to mitigate their damages, which they did by 
eventually compromising and settling their tax liability with the IRS for approximately 
$65,000.00. (Rec. p. 336). Deloitte suggests that it would be in the taxpayers' best interest 
to sue for accountant malpractice before completing their Tax Court challenge because they 
might be able to collect the full amount of the assessment from the accountant yet eventually 
resolve their tax liability for considerably less, thereby realizing a windfall. (Deloitte Br., 
p. 7 fn. 7). The Clarks dare to say, however, that if they in fact had sued Deloitte and 
recovered the full amount of their tax liability which eventually approached $500,000 with 
interest (Rec. p. 336) and then settled that liability for $65,000.00, Deloitte would be before 
the District Court seeking an amendment to the judgment or other relief. If anything, the 
fact that Clarks were eventually able to reduce, post-Tax Court decision, their tax liability 
to $65,000 would support an argument that the statute of limitations did not actually 
commence to run against these particular taxpayers until they paid the assessment. 
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Not only is the Tax Court's decision a binding, final judgment, but this fact clearly 
refutes Deloitte's claim that allowing the taxpayer to go through this process results in 
presentation of stale claims in violation of the policy underlying the statute of limitations in 
which evidence has been lost and witnesses' memories have faded. In this case, Deloitte is 
not prejudiced by the lag between when the statute of limitations would otherwise have run 
and when this action was eventually commenced. Deloitte knew almost as soon as the 
Clarks that there was a problem with both the tax advice and the 1986 tax return. The 
Clarks consulted Deloitte's employee, Vernon Calder, on the tax audit and that employee 
advised the Clarks to contest the IRS determination because the tax advice was "accurate." 
(Rec. p. 188, f 20). Moreover, during this entire tax review process, the Clarks continued 
to seek out Calder for advice as to how they should proceed and each time they were 
"assured" by Calder that the tax advice and corresponding tax return preparation were 
correct and that they should continue to contest the assessment. (Rec. p. 189, f 23). 
Additionally, by commencing and continuing the tax review process to and including 
a decision by the Tax Court, the Clarks not only preserved the essential evidence in this case, 
but that Tax Court decision conclusively established two of the elements which the Clarks 
need to prove in order to prevail on a malpractice claim against Deloitte. These elements 
are: (1) that the tax advice was "bad" or otherwise inconsistent with the law; and (2) that the 
Clarks have been damaged as a result of that advice. Until the Tax Court ruled that the 
additional taxes and penalties were owing, Deloitte was free to contend that its advice had 
been accurate and consistent with the law. Likewise, until the Tax Court ruled that the 
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additional taxes and penalties were owing, the Clarks' malpractice claim against Deloitte 
were not "ripe." Under these circumstances, the policy (avoidance of stale claims) by an 
application of the statute of limitations simply does not exist since the crucial evidence was 
preserved through the Tax Court trial process. 
THE FACT DRIVEN DISCOVERY AND EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL PRONGS OF 
THE DISCOVERY RULE WAS NOT APPROPRIATE FOR DECISION ON A 
MOTION TO DISMISS 
The discovery rule functions as an exception to the normal application of a statute of 
limitation. There are three situations in which the discovery rule applies: (1) when mandated 
by statute; (2) when the plaintiff does not become aware of the cause of action because of 
the defendant's concealment or misleading conduct; and (3) when the case presents 
exceptional circumstances so that the application of the general rule would be irrational or 
unjust. See Anderson v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 920 P.2d 575, 578 (Utah App. 1996). 
The Clarks concede there is no relevant statute that mandates or requires the 
discovery rule be applied in this case. Hence, they are relying upon the last two prongs of 
the discovery rule to toll the statute of limitations. These last two aspects of the discovery 
rule are essentially equitable estoppel, whereby the victim of malpractice claim does not 
accrue until he or she discovers both the injury and that the injury is or may be attributable 
to negligence and/or a defendant who causes a delay in the plaintiffs bringing of a cause of 
action is estopped from relying upon the statute of limitation as a defense to that action. As 
is true in all cases of equitable estoppel, for the doctrine to be invoked a plaintiff must show 
that, under the circumstances, he or she acted in a reasonable manner. See Warren v. Provo 
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City Corp., 838 P.2d 1125, 1129-30 (Utah 1992). More importantly, whether the Clarks 
acted reasonably under the circumstances in contesting the IRS's tax assessment or when 
they discovered or should have discovered both their injury and the possibility of negligence 
are questions of fact for the trier of fact. See Brenda v. Langford, 914 P.2d 45, 51 (Utah 
1996). This is especially true since the Clarks only embarked upon the tax review process 
because of the advice given to them by Deloitte, and other Courts faced with an accountant's 
similar advice to "fight" the IRS assessment have found that the statute of limitations is 
tolled during the actual review process. See Winn v. Estate of Holmes, 815 P.2d 1231,1235 
(Okl. App. 1991) (accountant's advice to taxpayers to protest IRS assessment tolls statute 
of limitations); Peat, Marwick, Mitchell, 565 So.2d 1326 (holding that because the 
accountants had "continued to assert that its advice was correct" the case was clearly 
distinguishable from other actions involving accountant malpractice and the statute of 
limitations).8 Cf. Day v. Rosenthal 170 Cal. App.3d 1125, 217 Cal. Rptr. 89, 114-116 
8
 Advising the Clarks to contest the IRS tax deficiency assessment also raises the 
possibility of a claim for breach of fiduciary duty, which the Clarks have alleged. (Rec. pp. 
190-91, % 26). A fiduciary is a person with a duty to act primarily for the benefit of another. 
A fiduciary is in a position to have and exercise, and does have an exercise to influence over 
another. A fiduciary relationship implies a condition of superiority of one of the parties over 
the other. In a fiduciary relationship, the property, interest, or authority of the other is placed 
in the charge of the fiduciary. See First Security Bank v. Banberry Development, 786 P.2d 
1326, 1333 (Utah 1990). A fiduciary relationship clearly existed between Deloitte and the 
Clarks. See Squyres v. Christian, 242 S.W.2d 786 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951) (holding that a 
public accountant was a fiduciary as a result of, among other things, providing tax advice 
to and preparing tax returns for the client). If Deloitte knew that its tax advice to the Clarks 
was illegal or otherwise inaccurate, it had a duty to advise them of this fact instead of 
recommending that they contest the IRS tax deficiency. Whether Deloitte in fact had such 
knowledge requires a factual record that can only be developed through discovery. But if 
discovery were to show that Deloitte was aware of its "bad advice" to the Clarks, yet still 
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(1985) (a tax attorney's advice to his clients to challenge the IRS assessment tolls the 
statute of limitations); Jackson Jordan Inc. v. Lydig, Voitn, Mayer, 633 N.E.2d 627,632 (111. 
1994) (equitable estoppel applied to prevent the running of the statute of limitation against 
attorney malpractice claims because the attorneys had given "reassurances" to the clients 
that the legal advice was sound).9 
CONCLUSION 
The Court should reject the District Court's determination that the receipt of a 90-Day 
Letter is the date on which all taxpayers' claims against their accountants for bad tax advice 
accrue. The selection of the 90-Day Letter, especially when the taxpayers are contesting 
the additional tax assessment and penalties is inconsistent with holdings in Seale and 
Merkley. Rather than a date certain for all taxpayers such as the Clarks, their respective 
causes of action could and should accrue at varying dates depending upon the facts involved 
told the Clarks to start and continue through the tax review process, this would support a 
claim for breach of fiduciary duty. More importantly, because the fiduciary's duty of 
disclosure is continuing, the Clarks' cause of action would have accrued well beyond the 
date of the September 19, 1991, 90-Day Letter. Equally important, the possibility of such 
a claim is clearly to the issues involved in this appeal. See Coleman v. Utah State Land 
Board, 795 P.2d 622, 624 (Utah 1990) (granting of a Motion to Dismiss is only appropriate 
if it clearly appears that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim). 
9
 Before the District Court, Deloitte attempted to argue that Calder was no longer one of 
its employees as of June 1,1987, thereby implying that it could not be charged with Calder's 
"bad" advice to the Clarks to contest the IRS assessment. Whether Calder was in fact 
employed by Deloitte after that time is properly the subject of discovery and not an issue of 
any relevance to the Motion to Dismiss, which is directed at the allegations of the pleading. 
Furthermore, even if true, the fact that Calder left Deloitte's employment would not relieve 
the latter of responsibility for. his subsequent actions or relieve Deloitte of the duty to correct 
misrepresentations either it or its employees had made to the Clarks. See Restatement 
{Second) Torts, §551(2)(c). 
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in each case. If, for instance the taxpayer accepts the assessment upon receipt of the 30-Day 
Letter, his or her cause of action accrues at that point in time. But so long as the taxpayer 
is challenging the legality of the IRS assessment, the claims are not ripe, and the statute of 
limitations does not commence to run. In the case of the Clarks, their claims did not accrue 
and the statute of limitations did commence to run until the Tax Court decision became final. 
But even if a taxpayer's claims against his or her accountant are determined by this Court 
to automatically accrue upon receipt of the 90-Day Letter, the statute of limitations was 
tolled in this case by Deloitte's advice to the Clarks to contest or fight that assessment. For 
these reasons, the District Court's dismissal of the Clarks' Amended Complaint with 
prejudice should be reversed and this matter should be remanded to the District Court for 
further proceedings. In the alternative, this matter should be remanded to the District Court 
with instructions to made a determination as to when the cause of action accrued10 and the 
10
 Deloitte argues that the District Court did identify a specific date on which the Clarks' 
claims accrued. (Deloitte's Br. p. 22). According to Deloitte, this determination was made 
when the District Court stated that "although the Plaintiffs' claims may have accrued much 
earlier, for purposes of this Motion, the Court finds that Plaintiffs' claims accrued at the 
latest in September, 1991, when the Plaintiffs received the statutory notice of deficiency 
from the Internal Revenue Service." {Mem. and Order at 4-5). But there are several things 
wrong with this contention. To begin with, the Memorandum Decision and Order was 
prepared by Deloitte's counsel {Rec. p. 294) and signed without change by the District Court 
over Clarks' objection. {Rec. pp. 304-310,353-360). That was improper and it makes those 
findings Deloitte's rather than the District Court's. See Everaard v. Hartford Accident & 
Indemnity Co., 842 F.2d 1186, 1193 (10th Cir. 1988) ("when the District Court adopts a 
party's proposed findings of fact wholesale or verbatim, resulting findings are not the 
original product of a disinterested mind"). Furthermore, if the District Court did in fact find 
that the receipt of the 90-Day Letter was the moment at which the Clarks' claim against 
Deloitte accrued, such a finding is arbitrary and not supported by the evidence. There is 
nothing in the District Court's Memorandum and Order nor in the factual record before the 
District Court to distinguish the date of the 90-Day Letter from any other of the possible 
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both before the District Court through post-judgment Motions and, if unsuccessful, on 
appeal. Finally, the Clarks request such other and further relief as to this Court seems just 
and merited under the circumstances. 
DATED this 23rd day of February, 2000. 
< / (\ 
esse C. Trentadue 
SUITTER AXLAND 
Co-Counsel for Plaintiffs/Appellants 
nothing in the District Court's Memorandum and Order nor in the factual record before the 
District Court to distinguish the date of the 90-Day Letter from any other of the possible 
dates for accrual of the Clarks' cause of action with the sole exception of the date on which 
the Tax Court decision became final. 
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